


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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO NFAC OCR  
(SY/TAG) (SY/I/PIB) SS/ID, FBI, WH/SITRM

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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DIST 1 JUNE 1978

[REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

1. THE CHILEAN MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC) ARE ATTEMPTING TO FORMULATE PLANS FOR A JOINT "SPECTACULAR" KIDNAPPING IN COLOMBIA. IF SUCCESSFUL, THE RANSOM MONEY WILL BE USED TO INFILTRATE MIR MEMBERS INTO NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CHILE.

2. [REDACTED] MAY 1978, A MIR REPRESENTATIVE IN BOGOTA TOLD A MEMBER OF THE FARC THAT A MIR LEADER FROM HAVANA, CUBA, IS EXPECTED IN BOGOTA NEAR THE END OF MAY. WHEN HE ARRIVES, BOTH MIR MEMBERS WILL TRAVEL TO FARC HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED KIDNAPPING WITH FARC LEADERS. THE

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1.5 (c)

LEADER OF THE FARC EIGHTH FRONT HAS ALREADY AGREED TO THE JOINT OPERATION, BUT FINAL APPROVAL CAN ONLY COME FROM FARC HEADQUARTERS.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE FARC MEMBER, WHO DID NOT KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THE MIR REPRESENTATIVE, SAID THAT THIS TYPE OF OPERATION WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE COORDINATION, TRAVEL, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF A SUPPORT MECHANISM, ALL OF WHICH WILL TAKE TWO TO THREE MONTHS.

4. IN ANTICIPATION OF A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION, THE MIR REPRESENTATIVE IN BOGOTA IS OBTAINING COLOMBIAN DOCUMENTATION FOR MIR MEMBERS TO USE FOR ENTERING CHILE. HE IS ALSO COLLECTING COURSE MATERIAL ON COLOMBIAN HISTORY AND SPANISH LANGUAGE PRONUNCIATION WITH A COLOMBIAN ACCENT.

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT A TARGET HAS BEEN SELECTED OR ANY OTHER DETAILS FORMULATED FOR THIS JOINT MIR-FARC OPERATION. THE FARC IS THE GUERRILLA ARM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA (PCC).)

6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], THERE ARE SERIOUS DIVISIONS IN THE MIR CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN CUBA OVER THE FUTURE POLITICAL COURSE OF THE MIR. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS REPORTEDLY DIVIDED BETWEEN THOSE WHO WOULD ADOPT A NON-VIOLENT, GRADUALIST, PRO-COMMUNIST

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1.5 (c)

PARTY OF CHILE (PCCH) LINE AND THOSE WHO CONTINUE TO CALL FOR ARMED  
REVOLUTION. NELSON GUTIERREZ AND ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE  
ARE THE NOTABLE HARDLINE HOLDOUTS. THE PCCH EXILED LEADERSHIP IS  
REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE FIDEL CASTRO TO CUT OFF SUPPORT  
TO THE MIR AND, IF NECESSARY, EXPEL THOSE WHO REFUSE TO ADOPT THE PCCH  
LINE.

IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THE MIR LEADERSHIP  
FACTION ADVOCATING ARMED ACTION WOULD LOOK FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO REGAIN  
THE REVOLUTIONARY INITIATIVE LARGELY UNAVAILABLE TO THEM IN THEIR OWN  
COUNTRY BY ALLYING THEMSELVES WITH AN ESTABLISHED LIKE-THINKING ORGANIZA-  
TION SUCH AS THE FARC IN AN OPERATION OF THIS SORT.

THAT THE MIR IS ATTEMPTING TO REORGANIZE AND MAKE  
A COMEBACK HERE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GROWING CLIMATE OF POLITICIZATION  
AND RELATIVE LIBERALIZATION NOW NOTICEABLE IN THE COUNTRY. THE PRINCIPAL  
MIR LEADER IN CHILE TODAY IS IN HIDING IN THE SOUTH AND WOULD CLEARLY  
WELCOME ANY TRAINED AND DEDICATED MILITANTS CAPABLE OF INFILTRATING INTO  
THE COUNTRY TO ADD WEIGHT TO WHAT IS NOW A RATHER DIMINISHED PARTY.)

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